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Abstract: 
The new regulatory governance perspective has introduced several insights to the 
study of Health Technology Assessment (HTA): it has broadened the scope for the 
analysis of HTA; it has provided a more sophisticated account of national diversity 
and the potential for cross-border policy learning; and, it has dissolved the distinction 
between HTA assessment and appraisal processes.  In this paper, we undertake a 
qualitative study of the French process for HTA with a view to introducing a fourth 
insight: that the emergence and continuing function of national agencies for HTA 
follows a broadly evolutionary pattern in which contextual factors play an important 
mediating role.  We demonstrate that the French process for HTA is characterised by 
distinctive institutions, processes and evidential requirements.  Consistent with the 
mediating role of this divergent policy context, we argue that even initiatives for the 
harmonisation of national approaches to HTA are likely to meet with divergent 
national policy responses. 
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A Regulatory Governance Perspective on Health Technology Assessment 
(HTA) in France: The Contextual Mediation of Common Functional 
Pressures 
 
1. Three Insights of the Regulatory Governance Perspective on HTA 
At the intuitive level, the field of regulatory governance and the study of HTA seem 
well suited to one another.  On the one hand, HTA is a means by which governments 
around the world have attempted to ensure comprehensive and equitable public access 
to the new and expensive range of medicines and treatments in the context of limited 
budgets for healthcare.  And on the other, regulatory studies is a subset of governance 
scholarship concerned with the analysis of governmental steering activities, rather 
than the public provision and distribution of resources, that focuses on ways in which 
governments consolidate and organise individual policy sectors, and the techniques 
they use to incentivise the players within them [4].  Taking advantage of this appeal, a 
new generation of scholars has opened a regulatory governance perspective on HTA 
to produce some valuable insights into the study of HTA in Europe [1,2,3]  . 
 
In the first place, regulatory scholars have broadened the scope for the analysis of 
HTA, demonstrating that HTA does not take place within single isolated institutions 
that apply self-selected methods and process, but occurs across a broader decision-
making network that responds to specific cultural and institutional environments.  
Considering the use of the Efficiency Frontier under the German approach to HTA, 
Klingler et. al. show that efforts to improve the conduct of HTA based on 
comparative analyses that describe different HTA methods, determine ‘what works 
best’ and formulate best practice guidelines for ubiquitous application are misguided.  
Policy makers, they suggest, are unlikely to introduce measures for the improvement 
of HTA that run counter to the existing cultural and historical preferences.  
Accordingly, the study of HTA must take place under a significantly broadened 
conceptualisation of HTA, and involve an analytical framework capable of capturing 
the relevant cultural, historical and institutional determinants [1].   
 
Secondly, regulatory scholars have also introduced a more sophisticated take on 
national diversity and policy learning with respect to HTA methods and processes.  
The field of regulatory governance reaches across the wide variety of policy sectors, 
from banking and finance, shipping and aviation, and gambling and healthcare, to 
name but a few.  Considering the role of the County Councils in the delivery of 
Swedish healthcare, Shah et al draw on the insights of regulatory governance theory 
to suggest that HTA scholars should expect to encounter diversity with regard to 
national methods and processes. Globalisation, they suggest, touches sectors, markets 
and regulatory regimes to different degrees.  In banking and finance, for example, 
both markets and regulations are global.  In terms of other sectors, like gambling and 
healthcare, however, both markets and regulations are national.  In the case of health 
technologies, regulations are subject to globalisation, but markets are not [5,6].  
Today, individual nation states are among the largest buyers in pharmaceutical 
markets.  Accordingly, there is more scope for variation in national regulatory 
arrangements for health technologies than in arrangements for sectors like banking, 
finance and aviation, which require unified regulatory regimes towards the 
construction of which nation states, private enterprises and third sector organisations 
necessarily collaborate [2, 7].  And certainly, in terms of institutions, processes and 
evidential requirements for HTA, national states exhibit significant differences and 
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divergences, which limits opportunities for policy learning across states.  However, 
this is not to imply the impossibility of policy learning, rather to suggest that complex 
national dynamics and traditional regulatory-governance structures have a bearing on 
the types of policy lessons that analysts might reasonably expect to extract and apply.  
Indeed, by using the right cases-studies, analysts may even increase the potential for 
policy learning and transference. For example, in the case of Sweden, some national 
environments, notably Spain which has a similarly structured health care system, may 
be more relevant to reflecting on and potentially improving the Swedish approach 
than other national models [2].     
 
Thirdly, regulatory governance scholars have problematized the notion of a 
distinction between HTA assessment and appraisal processes [3].  For example, some 
analysts suggest that HTA consists of a formal assessment process, which produces 
knowledge about new health-care technologies, and a more context-specific appraisal 
process, which translates the analysis into policy advice and decision-making [8].  
Under the distinction, HTA assessment processes are considered broadly transferable 
across national contexts. On this basis, some, and notably English analysts, have 
suggested that organisations like the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) in the UK set an international ‘benchmark’ for the use of evidence in HTA, 
which derives from the practice of evidence based medicine and even the European 
Enlightenment [9].  However, the regulatory governance perspective is unconvinced 
by these claims, affirming that appraisal and assessment processes are mutually 
constitutive, or that the policy making context in which HTA is conducted holds 
consequences for the way that evidence is used in the HTA process.  For regulatory 
scholars, NICE’s so called ‘assessment process’ has little to do, as English 
commentators are wont to suggest, with evidence based medicine and the European 
enlightenment, and much more do with the fact that NICE assessments must drive a 
health system that involves universal and free access to healthcare, and in which the 
profits and prices of pharmaceuticals are regulated by an initial agreement between 
industry and government.  Thus, regulator scholars claim that NICE’s rigorous, and 
arguably expensive, application of economic analyses, the use of Quality Adjusted 
Live Years (QALYs) as a benefit measure and a funding threshold, derive from the 
necessity to make comparisons of the cost-effectiveness of medicines across 
individual disease areas—for the purpose of establishing whether or not public money 
is more effectively invested in the latest cancer treatment or the latest diabetes 
treatment—or in other words, to ration healthcare [9].  In such cases, the regulatory 
governance perspective asserts the internal coherence of national approaches to HTA, 
denying that one can set a so-called ‘benchmark’ for any other system.  Indeed, the 
desirability of policy goals in particular contexts necessarily conditions any potential 
benchmarking exercises.  In other words, NICE could set a benchmark for HTA only 
insofar as the goal of rationing healthcare became desirable in other national contexts. 
However, even in that situation NICE would only constitute an adequate benchmark 
where the same values (utility maximization) underlay the rationing process.   
 
2. The Contextual Mediation of Common Functional Pressures 
The purpose of this paper is to articulate a fourth insight of the regulatory governance 
frame to the study of HTA. At the European level, the emergence of varied national 
approaches to the conduct of HTA has produced calls for the harmonisation of 
methods and processes across the EU.  And today, there remains significant interest in 
the exchange of information about HTA process and potential initiatives for cross-
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border collaboration in the name of reducing expenditure and the duplication of HTA 
work programmes [10, 11].  At the industry level, there is also much support from 
major pharmaceutical companies for a harmonisation of HTA methods for the 
purpose of producing nationally transferable results [12].  European policy analysts 
likewise support the establishment of a European drug pricing and reimbursement 
agency similar to the European Medicines Agency (EMA) [13].  Furthermore, they 
have suggested that comparative efficacy data should have a formal role in European 
drug approvals; and that European authorities should collaborate with national HTA 
agencies towards the better congruence of licensing and reimbursement requirements 
[14, 15].  Additionally, the European Parliament’s directive on patient rights and 
cross-border healthcare also supported more formalised cooperation between national 
HTA agencies through the European Network for Health Technology Assessment 
(EUnetHTA)[16]. These initiatives for harmonisation emphasise the benefits of 
adapting evaluations of individual technologies for cross-border use, and of 
developing systematic approaches to evaluating the efficacy of individual 
technologies in the context of alternatives. And more generally, they confront national 
governments with additional functional pressures and arguments for reforming 
methods and processes for HTA.   
 
With its significantly broader policy perspective, however, the regulatory governance 
frame sheds light on possible complicating factors.  For some time, regulatory 
scholars have studied the related emergence and institutional growth of independent 
agencies (IAs) in other policy sectors.  For regulatory scholars, the establishment of 
European IAs for HTA—such as NICE in England and the Haute Autorité de Santé 
(HAS) in France—is consistent with the similar establishment of IAs in other policy 
sectors like banking and finance, aviation and shipping, education and trade.  In each 
sector, the establishment of IAs reflects an increasingly technical and complex policy 
environment. Under a principal-agent theory, regulatory scholars suggest that nation 
states establish and delegate authority to IAs in response to common functional and 
political pressures within policy sectors, these pressures include: overcoming 
information asymmetries, blame shifting and dealing with complex and technical 
issues [17, 18]. Attempting to understand the proliferation of IAs across the wide 
variety of European policy sectors with the varying circumstances and forms in which 
they have arisen, regulatory scholars also argue that contextual factors strongly 
mediate national responses to these common pressures. Contextual factors  influence 
the circumstances and forms in which IAs arise and include among others: 
institutional isomorphism; state traditions and structures in regulation, political 
leadership and the broader institutional context of West European states [17].  For 
example, the nineteenth century British tradition of government through regulatory 
commissions facilitated the rapid rise of IAs in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s.  
However, the absence of such a tradition in Italy saw the proliferation of IAs only 
begin in earnest following the successful creation of the Competition Authority in 
1990 [17].  Thus, regulatory scholars conclude that the rise of IAs must be explained 
in relation to the unique contextual features of the national environments in which 
they develop [18].  For health policy analysts, the point is that initiatives for the 
harmonisation of HTA methods and processes need to reassess the scope of their 
ambitions via a much more detailed analysis of the circumstances in which national 
IAs for HTA have arisen.   
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To this end, we undertook an analysis of the institutions involved in the conduct of 
the French process for HTA with a view to discovering their unique institutional 
forms and their associated needs in terms of HTA methods and evidence bases.  In 
France, like any other developed nation, the production of increasingly sophisticated 
heath care technologies has left government struggling with the problem of balancing 
limited health budgets against the requirement to ensure comprehensive and equitable 
public access to new medicines and health technologies.  Conducted in 2011, our 
analysis details the ways in which the French system has been  responding to these 
common functional pressures. We found that the French process for HTA bears out 
the insights of regulatory governance theory. While other EU Member States, notably 
England and Scotland, have established single HTA agencies for the purpose of 
conducting cost-effectiveness and cost utility evaluations, France, at the time of 
interview, conducted HTA across a network of government agencies, none of which 
actually engaged in either cost-effectiveness analysis, or any other direct form of 
economic evaluation, but all of which played important roles in operating a range of 
mechanisms for containing healthcare spending. In 2011, the French approach to 
HTA was directed towards fixing both prices and levels of reimbursement for new 
health technologies.  At the time of interview, there seemed little prospect that this 
approach was likely to change.  In 2003, however, cost-effectiveness analysis had 
become compulsory part of the process, yet it did not involve the use of an associated 
threshold.  And on this basis, we press the fourth insight of the regulatory governance 
perspective on HTA: that the emergence and continuing function of national IAs for 
HTA follows a broadly evolutionary pattern in which contextual factors play an 
important mediating role.  Ultimately, we suggest that the task for analysts of HTA is 
to identify and reveal these patterns.  Specifically, initiatives for convergence, or goal 
related policy learning, must involve a tailored strategy for accommodating diverse 
regulatory governance arrangements and the differential impact, or even the 
relevance, that changes might have in alternative contexts.   
 
3. The French Multi-agency Approach to HTA 
In France, HTA serves the broader objective of reigning in government spending on 
and improving the quality of healthcare.  By 2011, however, French policy makers 
delivered this aim via a number of mechanisms: streamlining medical practices, 
promoting cost-effective treatment options, influencing prescribing behaviour, 
controlling prices and adjusting levels of reimbursement. Operating these mechanisms 
required the interaction of several government agencies, each of which played vital 
and complementary roles.  The institutional architecture of the French approach 
evolved in the 1990s under a variety of initiatives for reducing costs and improve 
efficiencies within the health system [19, 20, 21].  By 2011, the key organisation 
involved in the HTA process was the High Authority for Health (Haute Autorité de 
Santé, HAS). However, the evaluation of health technologies also involved a multi-
step, multi-stakeholder process in which other institutions outside the HAS played 
important roles in determining the value of new products through a pricing and the 
reimbursement process. These included the  Medicinal Products’ Pricing Committee 
(Comité Economique des Produits de Santé, CEPS) and the National Union of Health 
Insurers (Union Nationale des Caisses d’Assurance Maladie, UNCAM).   
 
Established in 2004, HAS is an independent government organisation tasked with 
improving the quality of patient care.  Its activities are wide ranging and include the 
assessment of new pharmaceuticals and medical devices, the publication of advice 
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regarding new procedures and also the authorisation of healthcare organisations and 
the certification of clinical professionals. Although its role is often compared with that 
of NICE in the UK, HAS issues opinions, recommendations and advice that integrate 
directly into a wider  decision-making network through which new technologies are 
introduced into the French healthcare system.  Through the work of its internal 
committees—the Transparency Commission (TC) for the appraisal of pharmaceutical 
products; the National Commission for the Evaluation of Medical Devices 
(CNEDIMTS), for medical devices and more recently the Commission for economic 
evaluation and public health (CEESP), HAS contributes to the wider HTA process by 
supporting the function of other agencies responsible for determining the benefits 
package, for regulating medical professionals and for determining price and 
reimbursement rates.  
 
The HAS evaluation is the first step in the French process for HTA [22, 23, 24]. 
Following the receipt of market authorisation, the manufacturer submits the 
technology to the relevant HAS committee. HAS evaluations are conducted on the 
basis of the manufacturer’s submission dossier, the Note of Therapeutic Interest (Note 
d’Intérêt Thérapeutique), and the available clinical and public health information 
regarding the technology. In scrutinising the available information, the committee 
establishes the individual clinical and therapeutic benefit (SMR, Service Medical 
Rendu) and the relative benefit (ASMR, Amelioration du Service Medical Rendu).The 
ASMR denotes the relative effectiveness of the technology against currently available 
medicines and therapies and informs the price setting activities of CEPS – since 2012 
in conjunction with medico-economic information produced by CEESP. The SMR 
denotes the degree of medical benefit or therapeutic ‘value’ of the medicine and is 
derived considering different criteria among them clinical efficacy, effectiveness, 
severity of treated disease, existence of therapeutic alternatives, and public health 
impact. It informs the decision-making processes of UNCAM, which is responsible 
for determining  whether or not the product is included in the list of medicines 
receiving coverage under the benefits package, and, at what rate the product will be 
reimbursed.  The price setting process typically precedes decision making regarding 
the reimbursement rate, but the two processes are also linked.  Pharmaceuticals 
without an ASMR rating, or those which exhibit neither any additional health benefit 
nor costs savings by comparison with the existing range of reimbursed 
pharmaceuticals, cannot be included on the benefit package.[25, 26, 27]  
 
At the time of interview in 2011, economic assessment techniques such as cost-
effectiveness analysis played no formal role in the HAS evaluation, which instead 
focused on a benefit assessment based on the SMR and the ASMR.  However, in 
2008, the Social Security Financing Act gave HAS a mandate in the area of economic 
evaluation. A new committee known as the CEESP (Commission évaluation 
économique et de santé publique) was created and initially tasked with developing 
holistic therapeutic strategies to drive efficiency savings throughout the healthcare 
system. Since 2012, HAS assessment also involves the production of economic 
efficiency data at the level of the proposals through CEESP, which is termed, the Avis 
d'Efficience.  This second Avis feeds directly into the decision-making process of the 
pricing committee by providing information designed to complement the TC’s benefit 
assessment, or the Avis sur les medicants.  These assessments are currently restricted 
to products that demonstrate significant added value and are likely to have a 
significant financial impact on pharmaceutical spending.  Nevertheless, the SMR and 
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ASMR remain the principal tools for determining the value of the majority of 
products. 
 
The CEPS is a committee comprised of various stakeholders from within the Ministry 
of Health and other organisations charged with responsibility for setting the price on 
new medicines.  CEPS takes responsibility for negotiating the price of the product 
with the manufacturer mainly on the basis of the ascribed ASMR ratings.  In 
conducting negotiations, CEPS also takes into consideration the necessary levels of 
healthcare investment, any requisite changes to screening programmes, the 
organisation of care, requirements for monitoring and dissemination of the technology 
and adjustments to the regulatory framework.  In the course of the negotiations, the 
Association of Pharmaceutical Industry (Les Entreprises du Médicament, LEEM), 
which represent the interests of the French pharmaceutical industry, also plays a role.  
Together LEEM and CEPS considered factors like expected levels of sales and 
comparative prices in other EU Member States.  But negotiations between the CEPS 
and the individual firm are also confidential.  And so, LEEM does not intervene 
directly in the price negotiation process.  In general, the completion period of the 
process for hospital-only drugs was 90 days from application to price settlement and 
180 days for retail pharmacists’ drugs.   
 
In 2011, health economic assessment techniques played no formal role in CEPS’s 
negotiations with firms.  Today, this is beginning to change as the CEPS will begin to 
considered the input of the new CEEPS committee. Nevertheless, the outcome of the 
negotiation process at CEPS continues to remain dependent on discussion and 
deliberation.  CEPS had a diverse membership.  In conducting negotiations, it 
balances budgetary and economic concerns with public health objectives.  Final 
decisions regarding pricing are often as much an internal debate within the members 
of the CEPS as they are a negotiation with the supplier.  Within CEPS, various 
competing objectives often carry the day.  For example, delegates from the Ministry 
of Health might pursue a strong public health agenda, or delegates from the Ministry 
of Industry and Research might seek to promote the uptake of effective new 
treatments, or to pursue a strong research and industry competitiveness agenda.  
Alternatively, delegates from the Social Security Division and Insurance Funds might 
pursue a payer’s agenda, aiming to maintain current levels of health expenditure and 
keeping prices low.  Other factors like public health needs, summarised by the SMR 
might also hold sway.  However, the precise contributions of each factor and interest 
group in determining price remained unclear [19, 28].  
 
Following the settlement of the price, UNCAM is responsible for setting the 
reimbursement rate.  In France, approved pharmaceuticals are reimbursed at either 
100%, 65% or 35%, with some reimbursed at 15% [29].  The SMR rating is important 
to UNCAMs settlement of the rate.  Typically, the rate is formalised on the basis of 
the SMR.  But UNCAM also negotiates with the medical professionals involved in 
the prescription of medicines, and other key stakeholders, before attaching any 
necessary patient co-payment.  Once the price and the rate were set, the process 
concluded with the Minister of Health either accepting or rejecting the technology for 
use in general practice or in hospitals [19].   
 
5. Methods  
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We conducted a qualitative study of the French approach to HTA with the intention of 
taking a snap shot of the process as it existed in 2011, and detailing why the approach 
was preferred and how it might evolve in comparison with other approaches.  The 
study combined an analysis of key policy documents and semi-structured interviews 
with French policy-makers, HTA producers, clinical professionals, academics and 
other stakeholders, and was conducted as part of a larger project on national 
approaches to HTA across the European Union, with other states including: England, 
Scotland, Germany and Sweden.    In total, 56 interviews were completed in four 
languages over a twenty week period in July-November 2011. In order to avoid 
unnecessary repetition of already published material, readers are encouraged to 
consult the fuller descriptions of our methods available elsewhere [1, 2]  In France, 
ten interviews were conducted with a wide range of stakeholders reflecting different 
perspective and interests, including senior government officials identified through 
their membership in the relevant committees.  These institutions included: the 
Ministry of Health, the department for Social Security (DSS) and the Department for 
Public Health (DGS) The High Health Authority (HAS), the Health Product Agency 
(AFSSAPS, now MSNA) the General National health Insurance fund (CNAM), the 
Health Economics and Outcomes Research Organisation (URC-ECO) and a relevant 
pharmaceutical company.   
 
Institution No of interviewees 
(N = 10) 
Department for Social Security (DSS) 2 
Department for Public Health (DGS) 1 
The High Health Authority (HAS), 2 
The Health Product Agency (AFSSAPS, now MSNA) 1 
The General National health Insurance fund (CNAM) 2 
Clinical research unit specialized in health economics 
(URC-ECO) 
1 
A Pharmaceutical company  1 
 
We report results under the following thematic headings: ensuring access through 
price negotiation and conditional reimbursement; focus on public health benefit not 
cost-effectiveness; multiple channels for controlling costs; and improving the process.  
In order to allow readers to distinguish between different voices, we identify 
interviewees according to the organisation they represent, for example (DGS) for the 
Direction Generale de la Sante,.   
 
6. Results 
(i) Ensuring access through price negotiation and conditional reimbursement  
Respondents suggested that a key advantage of the French approach to HTA was the 
ability to control costs through a system of price negotiation and conditional 
reimbursement based on the clinical and public health benefit of new technologies.  
Respondents asserted that HAS’s critical role in the HTA process was to enable CEPS 
to negotiate and fix a price for technologies with the manufacturer.  In other words, 
HAS itself did not make decisions; it provided insights into the relative value of new 
technologies in order to facilitate a decision making process that ultimately lead to a 
price negotiation, setting the level of reimbursement of new technologies and 
determining the position of the product in the therapeutic catalogue.  In this respect 
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respondents suggested that the activities of HAS and CEPS were broadly non 
comparable with those in other EU Member States.  In France, “the goal of HTA is to 
facilitate decision making, if you take NICE, it is more than facilitating decisions, it is 
a decision” (HAS). In this way, HAS produced qualitatively different kinds of 
information about technologies than other European agencies such as, TLV and 
NICE.  Respondents also recognised the differences between the wider role that HAS 
played within the French HTA process compared with other national IAs, in particular 
NICE, and that this divergent role necessitated the output of different kinds of 
technology assessments. “In England, they use a cost per QALY threshold to decide 
whether or not to adopt a new drug. In France, our assessment is done in two steps, 
first assess the therapeutic progress (i.e. the ASMR) and the economic assessment is 
left to CEPS which will negotiate its trading price” (HAS).  
 
Respondents thought that the HTA process was conducted across a network of 
institutions, that HAS’s role in this process was to facilitate a negotiation process with 
the manufacturer, under which prices for new technologies were fixed along 
budgetary constraints.  In conducting negotiations, CEPS required a diverse range of 
evidence.  It needs to consider “the actual benefit and also the public health need of 
the population. The CEPS therefore knows what its margins are, and taking into 
account these elements, you have a price / volume negotiation” (DSS).  The role of 
HAS in the process was to provide these elements through the initial HAS 
assessment.  “The HAS assessment is the basis on which we rely to fix prices on the 
one hand, that’s the role within the Economic Committee for Health Products, and 
secondly, to determine the rate of reimbursement, that's the role of UNCAM” (DSS).  
In UK, by contrast, “NICE is a price taker…there is actually a threshold below which 
they do not take things in the 'benefits package'; under which they decide not to cover 
the product under the NHS” (URC-ECO).  Respondents were concerned to 
distinguish between the role of French and UK agencies for HTA with the former 
perceived to aid negotiations on price and scope; and the latter to make decisions 
about inclusion and exclusion— or, in other words, the rationing of health care.  In 
France, the ability to negotiate prices eliminated the requirement for an abstract 
threshold.  And indeed, some respondents even expressed amazement that the English 
system of a cost per QALY threshold should be preferred over the negotiation of 
prices with manufacturers.  “The use of willingness to pay thresholds is commonly 
used and it doesn’t seem to shock anyone to put an efficiency threshold to determine 
whether a drug will be covered by the NHS.  This is not something that corresponds to 
the French way of thinking” (DSS). In France, the role of HAS was to produce 
outputs that can drive a process of price negotiation between CEPS and the 
manufacturers by providing relevant information regarding the clinical  and public 
health benefits of the new technology.   
 
Secondly, respondents pointed out that HAS also facilitated a process at the level of 
reimbursement, which also aided decision-making by establishing the status of the 
technology. “The HAS assessment is the basis on which we rely to negotiate its prices 
but also to define the status of the product and its position as part of the benefits 
package and to determine the rate at which we will reimbursement the product but 
also, but that’s the role within the Economic Committee for Health Products. So 
essentially it is on the basis of this assessment that all stakeholders rely on to 
determine access, the level of reimbursement and establish the prices” (DSS).  
Respondents intimated that the French healthcare budget “is not a sealed envelope 
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with fixed budget constraints… products will be reimbursed by the social health 
insurance fund” (URC-ECO).  Policymakers reimburse drugs at different rates with 
the broader aim of making all drugs available. “We do not want to always be 
perceived to be restricting access especially on the basis of cost.  So we ensure all 
drugs are accessible, and then we try to achieve the best price on one hand and 
control volume and use on the other" (CNAM).  HAS assessments allowed decision 
makers to prioritise different technologies.  For example, in order to accommodate 
expensive medicines, “we will happily reduce coverage on other high volume 
products which offer very little therapeutic gain in order save money and free up 
funding for expensive treatment” (CNAM).  Similar to the negotiation of price, the 
ability to alter levels of reimbursement gave the French system additional flexibility.  
“We are not in a framework of having a fixed budget for the year whereby health 
provider have to choose between funding a drug or being able to maintain its basic 
services” (HAS).  In order to control costs, French policy makers can “lower the rate 
of reimbursement for certain drugs, and we reduce the price on others, but we do it in 
the logic of our system…So essentially, on the one hand, we will pay for a cancer 
treatment that will provide only two additional months of life, but on the other hand, 
we will reduce coverage on cough medicines whose therapeutic value is limited.  
When you look at what we end up reducing the coverage on, it is always a product 
that has an inadequate SMR (i.e. lower therapeutic benefit). So that’s really the trend 
in France” (DSS). To sum the argument up: HAS is not in the same mind-set as other 
HTA agencies (e.g. NICE) who are sometimes required to make absolute choices. As 
a result, HAS does not need to produce the same kind of information and is therefore 
employing different methods, because it is not deciding on inclusion or exclusion of 
pharmaceutical products from public reimbursement – which is broadly rejected as a 
practice –, but only producing information to inform price negotiation and the setting 
of reimbursement rates. 
 
(ii) Focus on public health benefit not cost-effectiveness 
Respondents were not only critical of the decision-making process based on a cost-
per-QALY threshold as such, but also reported strong distrust of basing their 
decisions on economic arguments in general citing their lack of focus on public health 
and epidemiological evidence.  Even where negotiations were assumed to remain the 
standard route for making pricing and reimbursement decisions, experts were critical 
of introducing cost-effectiveness data to those processes. “I don’t think we want to 
end up with a ‘NICE-type’ system in France.  Because…from the public health point 
of view, the NICE-type cost per QALY threshold approach is not appropriate… if we 
don’t think a little bit more in terms of public health benefits, we are going to have 
problems…you still have to defend the interests of patients and also integrate the 
medical and economic criteria.  But the health economics criteria should not be at the 
forefront of our decision making process, otherwise, we are no longer serving public 
health objectives” (DGS).   
 
Given their focus on public health, respondents suggested that the French approach to 
HTA provided a more legitimate basis on which to reduce costs in the system. In this 
regard, they were concerned to highlight the differences between their own approach 
to HTA compared with the approaches of other European states, notably England.  
“Between the highly formal system used by NICE in England, where methodologies 
for allocating resources in healthcare are well defined and clear cut, but ultimately 
the final decisions is sometimes modified due to public demand and pressure from 
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patients; and the more informal system in France which is exactly the opposite, with a 
more flexible and open process which relies more on opinion and debate than on 
evidence, but at least the outcome of the consensus is better accepted and much more 
easily implemented in France than the outcome of some HTA decisions in the UK” 
(HAS) 
 
The implication is that HTA processes that emphasise public health and clinical 
benefits are more acceptable to the French public than approached that focuses on 
econometric measures. In other words, decision-making procedures that raise the 
value of cost-effectiveness data over clinical benefits would likely heighten public 
anxieties about the HTA process—a fact also observed in the UK.  For this reason, 
French policy makers are uncomfortable with such initiatives. As our informants 
suggest, France is not completely against considering economic arguments in their 
decision-making process; but are concerned to point out that these should not be the 
most important  arguments (as they presume is the case with NICE) in deciding on 
pricing and reimbursement of drugs. This essentially means that in terms of 
controlling costs and regulating access, the French process appears to give a higher 
weight to public health consideration which guarantee access while the English 
approach puts more emphasis on access conditions based on cost-effectiveness to 
meet strict resource allocation constraints. 
 
(iii) Multiple Channels for Controlling Costs  
HAS evaluations also produced information that supported changes to clinical 
practice.  “For us, HTA is the tool which we use to help support the decisions and 
actions we make to shape and reorganise the healthcare system and the practice of 
health professionals.  And therefore as an overarching objective, the control of health 
care spending growth in France since as you know, we're not in a mindset of reducing 
spending and rationing care”(DSS). In driving this process of price negotiations, our 
respondents suggested that HAS outputs needed to hold legitimacy for clinical and 
public health audiences. “The opinion released by HAS is independent and we use 
their recommendation to back us up in our activities. It is essentially the endorsement 
of everything we do so that is important to us as it gives our actions a more legitimate 
and more credible voice which resonates more clearly with the medical 
professionals” (CNAM).   
 
Respondents also suggested that improving the delivery of care through the use of 
HTA held the potential to reduce waste in the system and contain healthcare budgets 
at the coal face of the patient-clinician relationship.  “There are huge sources of 
quality and efficiency gains that can be driven across the spectrum of delivery of care 
that are potential sources of savings. This will not only allow us to slow the growth of 
health spending so that it remains sustainable, but also improve the quality of care 
because as it stands there is a huge amount of waste in the delivery of care within our 
system” (DSS).  And to this end, HAS evaluations played a role in defining a 
hierarchy of therapeutic strategies for the purpose of delivering a patient level agenda 
for increasing both quality and cost efficiency. “The idea is to find the most efficient 
therapeutic strategies and to promote the proper and efficient use of these medical 
technologies and establish standards of practices.  This is currently the way that 
health economic evaluation is carried out in France” (DSS).  For example, the initial 
HAS assessment produces an ASMR rating and range of treatment options, measured 
by cost, which clinicians are required to consult.  “Our objective is that given equal 
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health outcomes, a doctor should choose the least costly treatment. That’s the basis of 
our work at the HAS, i.e. provide recommendations, information materials such as a 
monthly publication that will influence physician behaviours and promote cost 
effective and quality based medical practices” (HAS).  
 
At the time of interview, HAS was also engaged in “work to ensure the appropriate 
use of medicines such as promoting the use of generic medicines. It's the same quality 
at lower cost or even better quality at an additional but acceptable cost.” (DSS). 
Essentially, HAS was attempting to empower clinicians to prioritise technologies and 
to take part in delivering savings.  “The strategy involves a series of programs called 
‘medical control’ (maitrise médicalisé) which involve going to visit doctors but also 
dentists, chiropractors, physiotherapists, nurses, all professionals to try to make them 
aware of the use of a certain number of acts or regulations and promote the 
appropriate use of health products and develop accompanying program of 
professional and scientific articles to try to arrive at the right prescription” (HAS).  
Given that HAS did not make decisions, other actors within the system, notably 
clinicians, became responsible for the rationing of healthcare at the coalface of 
clinical practice.  “So if there is only 10% or 15% of the patient population who really 
need the latest drug because it offers fewer side effects, well it is up to the doctor to 
identify who these patients are and not up to us. And that's why we develop broad 
recommendations that say, ‘here is the order of magnitude of cost efficiencies that 
you ought to target as part of prescription patterns’” (CNAM).    Until recently, this 
type of approach has served as an alternative way to control cost rather than 
introducing cost-effectiveness analysis. It consisted of providing health professionals 
with the relevant clinical effectiveness information to allow them to priorities 
treatments within the appropriate clinical context, without taking into consideration 
the cost of the product. However, over time, respondents recognize that this method 
has shown its limitations, as it has not allowed to effectively contain pharmaceutical 
expenditure. As pointed out by one of our respondent, “we always have structural 
deficit problems within the social health insurance budget. The current system of HTA 
in France has not allowed us to stay within our annual tentative budget.”(URC-
ECO). 
 
(iv) Improving the process 
Respondents also made criticisms of the French system.  They held strong opinions 
about how the process could be improved.  On the whole, however, their suggestions 
for improvement served to consolidate the divergent French approaches to HTA, 
rather than seeking convergence with other national models.  Whilst respondents 
recognised that the French HTA process has significant limitation in terms of its 
ability to control costs and remain with the budget, respondents were also adamant 
that the French process held more legitimacy than the English approach, which 
largely focused on ensuring value for money. Seeking improvements to the system, 
most respondents expressed confidence in the multi-agency approach, but suggested 
that the evidence base on which decisions were taken could be improved.  They 
argued that HAS needed to produce better information.  When pressed about the 
nature of these improvements, respondents argued that the process required improved 
levels of epidemiological data at the regional level to better understand the impact of 
new technologies in different environments showing again the French emphasis on 
public health indicators instead of cost-effectiveness data.  Generally, they remained 
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unsure about where cost-effectiveness and an associated threshold data could be 
incorporated within the process.  
 
Respondents suggested that the key problem with HAS assessments was the lack of a 
solid grounding in the evidence.  “Our problem is that the committees at the HAS or 
even the Medicines Agency rely too much on the opinion of its experts without having 
enough evidence or solid data to back-up what they say. Essentially, our method of 
evaluations in France are based on ‘I think that…’ or ‘in my opinion…’ type 
statements, and when we asked for data, there isn’t any! There is rarely any 
epidemiological data produced on the disease, nor any data on the target 
populations. Our assessment should not be solely based on expert opinions but also 
on facts and evidence!”(DGS). Specifically, they argued that levels of 
epidemiological and public health evidence regarding new technologies needed to be 
improved. “It is necessary that we have a reflection of public health need at every 
level and develop an evidence based approach to decisions making which will allow 
us to identify its place in the therapeutic strategy. There is a lack of epidemiological 
data on the disease.  There is a lack of reflection of public health in relation to public 
health plan.  So it is difficult” (DGS). 
 
When pressed about an increased role for economic assessment within the system, 
responds were broadly supportive.  “We would be keen to integrate the notion of 
health economic assessment so that it becomes an integral part of the HTA process as 
part of a wider evaluation in which there would be both a scientific assessment and 
an economic evaluation in parallel” (DGS).  However, they also recognised that 
integrating cost-effectiveness data within an evaluation process that serves a wider 
process designed to set prices and levels of reimbursement would be difficult and 
possibly counterintuitive.  “We are essentially in a ‘value-based pricing’ type model 
and so the question is, how do we integrate health economics consideration into the 
two step ‘value based’ system …how do you combine the ‘effectiveness’ element with 
the ‘efficiency’ element… it’s broader value to society and public health…how do you 
merge all that together?” (URC-ECO)   
 
Respondents doubted the utility of a cost-effectiveness threshold to the price 
negotiation process.  Certainly, the rigorous calculation of cost-effectiveness and cost 
utility data might improve the policy-makers position within the negotiations.  “The 
idea of bringing the two assessment together comes from the need to become more 
evidence based and provide the pricing committee with more rigorous and more 
objective analysis of the broader value of the product using key criteria in order to 
come up with a price” (DGS). However, the cost-effectiveness of a technology may 
not actually reflect the cost of its production to the manufacturer.  “You cannot just fix 
a price and expect the manufacturer to agree to market his product. If the price 
imposed on the manufacturer is too low, he may well decide that he will not market its 
product.”(DSS).  Furthermore, the cost-effectiveness of a technology might not also 
reflect its value to patients.  “In the case of certain medicines, namely breast cancer 
drugs for example, there were such strong pressures from patients that they (the 
English) ended up adopting the drug despite the fact that its cost effectiveness ratio 
was above the 30K/QALY threshold simply because there was nothing else available 
out there” (CNAM). 
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Thus, at the time of interview, cost-effectiveness analysis was yet to find a place in 
the French process.  Under a value-based pricing model, economic analysis could 
never “replace … the Public Health criteria.  The health economics analysis would 
have to be an additional criterion that one can use to influence the decision but not to 
make it” (DGS).   Generally, respondents were unsure about where cost-effectiveness 
analysis would fit within the system.  At best, they could suggest that it would be “…a 
matter of building the necessary expertise within both the agencies and the evaluation 
committees to read and process evaluations. There must be enough experts both on 
the side of the industry as on the side of the public institutions and currently, this 
critical mass of health economic expert does not exist” (HAS).  In sum, they argued 
that cost-effectiveness data needed to position itself within the existing system, rather 
than make any attempt to redefine the process at large.   
 
6. Discussion 
Our results bear out an important insight of the regulatory governance frame: that 
national responses to the common functional pressure for reducing the cost of 
healthcare are mediated by contextual factors.  At the time of interview, the French 
process for HTA had evolved several distinct characteristics, of which participants in 
the process, at various levels, were well aware: it took place across a network of 
institutions; it facilitated a focus on public health; it opened a multiplicity of 
mechanisms for reducing the costs of healthcare including liaison with medical 
professionals; it was sustained by a system of price negotiations and rates for 
reimbursement; and it accordingly involved no role for cost-effectiveness modelling 
against a threshold.  Moreover, in seeking to improve to the system, our respondents 
were concerned to build upon these diverse characteristics.  Thus, the role, function 
and research outputs of an organisation like HAS are not only broadly non-
comparable with those of other national agencies like NICE and TLV; they are likely 
to remain as such.  In the same way, even initiatives for the harmonisation of HTA 
methods and processes must run the gauntlet of an existing environment involving 
multiple agencies operationalising multiple mechanisms for pursuing cost 
efficiencies, which in turn demand specific types of evidence and analysis to drive the 
process.   
 
This, however, is not to suggest that there is no scope for change in France or any 
other nation state, only to affirm that where change occurs, it will take place within an 
environment of difference and diversity. Consequently, analysts can expect that 
national approaches to HTA will continue to exhibit considerable levels of hybridity 
and divergence.  At the time of interview, for example, it was reasonable to assume 
that functional pressures to achieve cost-efficiencies might, in the future, weigh more 
heavily on the French model and admit some form of economic analysis in HAS 
evaluations.  Indeed commentators had been suggesting for some time that French 
policy makers were likely to alter the French process by giving health economics 
modelling a greater role [25].  In 2008, the Social Security Finance Act had already 
introduced the prospect of incorporating the use of economic evaluation within HAS 
processes.  And the same year, HAS’s Commission for Economic Evaluation and 
Public Health (Commission évaluation économique et de santé publique, CEESP) was 
established to oversee the integration of cost-effectiveness into clinical practice and 
public decision making.  By 2009, HAS had also began to develop a societal benefit 
measure, SERC (service rendu à la collectivité), for the purpose of capturing not only 
the medical and economic costs and benefits of health services; but also important 
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ethical, social, and legal considerations [25]. In fact, the introduction of cost-
effectiveness analysis within the new CEESP committee in late 2013 represents an 
important change in the HTA process in favour of some level of convergence, but its 
practical application has yet to be assessed. For the future, France might prove to be a 
useful case study of how a substantive shift from a public health focused HTA 
process to one explicitly taking into account cost-effectiveness data can take place. 
Analysts might be well advised to look more closely at how the cultural change in 
France is materializing to understand how harmonization in a contextually diverse 
environment can take place.   
 
The point is, however, that the existing environment continues to structure and shape 
these developments.  Although economic evaluation enjoys a greater role, the French 
process does not involve a cost-effectiveness threshold, which remains largely 
superfluous to the current system of value-based pricing.  Equally, other 
commentators suggest that related concerns for innovation and the industry may 
forestall the inclusion of strict cost-effectiveness assessments, pointing to the already 
lower than average costs of pharmaceuticals in France compared with the EU [30].  
Given these structural limitations, a further expansion of the role of cost-effectiveness 
data and inclusion of a threshold seems unlikely in the near term, and considerations 
of value for money within the French process will probably continue to focus on 
broader than health benefits of new technologies and treatments [25].   
 
But these are relatively small changes.  Where advocates of the harmonisation agenda 
press wider claims for transnational collaboration on HTA to support the 
dissemination of individual evaluations across national borders, the prospects for 
change seem much more remote [11].  At least intuitively, the production of 
transferable HTA reports might lessen the need for multiple reports on the same 
health technologies.  And further, transnational dissemination of individual evaluation 
results might appear to save time and resources [15].  Practically speaking, however, 
it seems that the production of transferable information regarding the impact of 
individual treatments, the possession of comparative information regarding the 
effectiveness of individual technologies, will be significantly less useful in driving an 
individual HTA processes, like the French approach, than is currently imagined in the 
academic literature. Where commentators suggest that regulators and decision makers 
require information on the effects of specific treatments on individual patients, our 
respondents seemed to value epidemiological data which quantifies the wider impact 
on public health.  In general, they seemed interested in national issues like whether or 
not asthma drugs should be prioritised over other disease areas given the levels of 
national incidence, and whether certain populations, who might be less likely to have 
supplemental healthcare coverage, are more likely to contract asthma and require 
treatment.     
 
7. Conclusion 
The regulatory governance perspective introduces a number of useful insights to the 
study of HTA.  Where some analysts have assumed that initiatives for the 
improvement and harmonisation of HTA processes involves a straightforward 
business of describing different methods, determining ‘what works best’ and 
formulating best practice guidelines for ubiquitous application, our findings suggest 
that delegation of authority to IAs for HTA follows a broadly evolutionary pattern 
which allows for substantial variation in national responses to the common functional 
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pressures and advantages leading to their establishment.  In the sectors like 
healthcare, there is significant scope for divergence and hybridity to emerge and 
evolve with regard to national approaches to HTA.  Given that initiatives for 
harmonisation will necessarily run the gauntlet of these divergences, it can be said, 
and with some certainty, that even an agenda for the harmonisation of HTA methods 
will likely meet with varied national responses. Further, such an agenda for 
harmonisation is likely to be successful only insofar as is it takes the cultural, 
institutional and political backgrounds of the existing HTA systems seriously, and 
insofar as it builds any strategies for improving HTA on an in-depth understanding of 
these influences. For the future, developing a catalogue or a taxonomy of HTA case 
studies that allows researchers to extract such lessons from relevant national contexts 
might become a research priority for analysts working in the field. 
 
 
 
Note 
The introductory sections of the paper draw upon work in other papers published by 
this research group [1, 2, 3]. This is due to the fact that we have conducted this 
research together and have developed and applied the theoretical framework for 
analysis jointly. 
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